Africa’s Bargaining Power in a Second Scramble

Saturday, 24 October 2026

On 14 March 2024, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Chinese partners amended Sicomines, a copper-and-cobalt venture agreed in 2008. The Chinese consortium kept 68 per cent ownership and state miner Gécamines 32 per cent. But the infrastructure envelope rose to $7 billion, including past spending; the revision added 1.2 per cent royalties on turnover and up to $324 million a year for infrastructure, conditional on copper prices. The DRC gained the right to market 32 per cent of annual output. IMF, DRC review, June 2024 · DRC Presidency, fifth amendment bulletin, March 2024

That is not simply a foreign power taking a country, nor proof that the old bargain was fair. It is a contract: claims on minerals, revenue and infrastructure negotiated under unequal but changing conditions. “Second colonisation” is useful when it directs attention to who controls strategic choices without formally ruling territory. It misleads when it turns every investor, lender, cloud provider or military partner into one actor in a hidden project.

The evidence is more concrete than that. To assess control, ask what is signed, who can enforce it, which revenues reach the public budget, what data or access is granted, and how much room remains to renegotiate.

The mineral is not the whole bargain

The 2024 Sicomines amendment shows both a shift in leverage and its limits. IMF staff said the original 2008 arrangement tied mining rights to infrastructure loans and was criticised for opaque vehicles and infrastructure spending that lagged reported mining profits. Higher production, civil-society pressure and a new round of negotiation preceded the 2024 amendment. The revised deal kept the ownership shares, changed part of the financing from loans to grants, added royalties and gave Gécamines a route to sell a portion of output independently—one tool against transfer-pricing risk. IMF, DRC review, June 2024

The terms deserve scrutiny. Infrastructure payments depend on copper prices and profits; $7 billion is not an unconditional cheque to the Congolese treasury. The IMF says the revenue and spending need transparent budget treatment and public reporting. In June 2026, it again called for stronger public-finance management, revenue mobilisation and diversification. These are fiscal mechanisms, not evidence that a lender secretly directs the Congolese state. IMF, DRC 2026 review, 27 June

The distinction matters. A royalty on turnover is paid against sales, before a company calculates net profit; an income tax on profits can shrink if costs rise or accounting shifts. A share of output that the state company can market independently may give the government information and bargaining leverage over prices. An infrastructure commitment can build roads and power the mine and surrounding economy, but if projects are selected opaquely or do not match local needs, the country can still surrender public value without building public capacity. To assess a deal, read the triggers, payment waterfall, marketing rights, audit clauses and disclosure requirements—not just the total printed on a communiqué.

A weak bargain can materially constrain sovereignty without, by itself, proving a new colonial relationship. If a contract commits future mineral proceeds before they reach the budget, it can limit spending years later even when a sovereign government signed it. The signature, ratification, ownership share, remedies and actual enforcement still matter.

Debt can narrow choices without taking the flag

Mining finance has a particular appeal for governments that need roads, ports and power but face limited tax revenue and costly borrowing. A resource-backed structure may bring capital and infrastructure forward, while repayment depends on output or commodity prices. The price risk is then shared unevenly: if copper falls, the infrastructure budget may contract just as the country’s general revenue does; if prices surge, the state must be able to track sales and collect what the agreement promises. If debt service or guarantees take priority over public investment, the deal’s economic benefit can be much smaller than its construction value.

That does not make every resource-backed loan a “debt trap.” Debt is a public liability, not ownership of a mine or a right to govern. Check the borrower, guarantee, collateral, revenue pledge, repayment priority, governing law, arbitration process and disclosure. Opaque guarantees make the exposure harder for legislatures and citizens to see. The IMF’s 2026 Zambia mission called for a fiscal framework that accounts for volatile mining revenue and for greater copper value addition. IMF, DRC, June 2026 · IMF, Zambia, 14 May 2026

Public finances set a hard limit on bargaining. Governments may have strong political claims to mineral wealth but lack the electricity, water, railways, engineers, cheap finance or domestic customers needed to process everything at home. Building a refinery or smelter can require years of power investment and a reliable supply of ore. A rule that forces local processing before those conditions exist can strand production or invite exceptions that weaken the rule. The choice is not simply “raw exports” or “full sovereignty”; it is which feasible stages of the chain can be built, by whom, with what public return, and how fast local capability can grow.

This is where regional scale matters. The African Union’s Green Minerals Strategy, published in 2025, sets out a continental aim to move beyond raw exports toward processing, manufacturing and regional value chains. The African Development Bank’s 2026 ministerial forum likewise argued that nationally fragmented approaches weaken bargaining power and that minerals, power, corridors, skills and markets have to connect across borders. African Union, Green Minerals Strategy, 18 March 2025 · AfDB, ministerial forum, 16 July 2026

There are practical paths beyond a slogan. UN Trade and Development’s 2026 assessment for Zambia identified more than 400 potential products across 25 sectors, including 73 linked to energy-transition minerals, representing at least $1.4 billion in potential export opportunities. These are modeled opportunities, not guaranteed sales. Their point is that diversification depends on existing skills, inputs and regional demand—not merely on the presence of copper ore. UNCTAD, Zambia diversification assessment, February 2026

Digital infrastructure has its own contract clauses

The next frontier is not a mine pit but the systems that store data, process payments and run public services. A government buying cloud capacity can gain reliable software, computing power and security capabilities that would be expensive to build alone. A cloud contract can also create dependence if the state cannot move its data and applications, audit access, change provider, or keep the service running during a dispute. The issue is not whether the provider is foreign; it is what the contract says about data location, lawful access, encryption keys, portability, subcontractors, price changes, termination and continuity.

The infrastructure gap makes the trade-off real. The World Bank reported in 2026 that data-centre capacity averages roughly 0.33 megawatts per million people in Africa, against about 15 megawatts globally. Domestic hosting can strengthen control, but requires reliable power, cables, customers, capital and skilled operators. A data-localisation rule will not create them. World Bank Group, digital connectivity results, FY2026

African policy makers have started to define a regional alternative. The African Union’s Data Policy Framework aims to harmonise governance and support a shared data space that protects rights while enabling intra-African digital trade. In November 2025, West and Central African ministers went further in the Cotonou Declaration, calling for regional data centres to host at least 40 per cent of critical government data by 2028. That is a stated regional goal, not a completed transfer of control. AU, Data Policy Framework, 28 July 2022 · Cotonou Declaration, 18 November 2025

Payments show how regional infrastructure can reduce dependence. Cross-border transfers through correspondent banks and a major foreign currency can bring conversion spreads, fees and delays. The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System, launched by Afreximbank with the AU Commission and AfCFTA Secretariat, is designed for payments across African currencies. In July 2026 it reported connections to 28 countries, 190-plus banks and fintechs, and 16 switches. Membership is not universal use: local settlement still needs liquidity, reliable FX pricing and regulation. PAPSS, 9 July 2026

Access is written into agreements

Military access, too, is a contract category with terms that matter. Ghana’s 2018 defense-cooperation agreement with the United States sets out the status of U.S. forces and access to agreed facilities and areas. It was signed on 9 May and entered into force on 31 May. The treaty’s preamble describes cooperation as based on respect for each party’s sovereignty. The agreement creates specific legal access rights; its public text is the place to assess scope, use, duration and force status. Its existence alone does not mean that Ghana gave up control of its territory. U.S. treaty text, 2018 · Ghana Parliament record

The same discipline applies to digital-access proposals. In May 2026 Ghana rejected a proposed U.S. health agreement after its Data Protection Commission raised concerns about access to health data and safeguards. The draft was not made public, so claims about its full terms should remain attributed to the Commission’s director, who described them to the Associated Press. The documented outcome is that Ghana did not sign and sought revised terms. A government can face financing pressure and still refuse a proposal. Associated Press, 1 May 2026

The leverage is real—and conditional

Africa’s mineral endowment does improve its potential bargaining position: global industries need copper, cobalt, lithium and other inputs. But scarcity is not a negotiating strategy by itself. States compete with one another for capital; companies can delay projects, shift sourcing or invest elsewhere; and governments need the tax receipts, jobs, power and roads now. A fragmented region gives buyers options to play jurisdictions against each other. A coordinated regional market, credible rules and public contract disclosure make the threat to walk away more believable.

Nor is outside capital necessarily a loss. It can bring financing, technology, construction expertise and market access that a country does not yet have. Those benefits are not automatic; local procurement, training, tax collection, environmental safeguards and transferability have to be written into enforceable rules and monitored. The African Mining Vision has long called for transparent, equitable exploitation and for mining to connect to infrastructure, jobs, small businesses and manufacturing. The test is whether a project leaves those capabilities behind when the first export shipment leaves. African Union, African Mining Vision

“Second colonisation” is most useful as a warning about quiet transfers of leverage: future revenues committed outside the budget, data systems a government cannot move, payments it cannot settle without outside permission, or military rights whose duration and scope are difficult to unwind. It is least useful when used as a verdict on nationality or as a substitute for reading a contract. The public record shows unequal bargaining and real capacity gaps, but it also shows African governments revising contracts, setting regional rules, building payment infrastructure and rejecting proposals. The decisive question is not who arrived with capital. It is whether the terms leave African citizens and states with more productive capacity and more choices when the deal ends.

Evidence cutoff: 24 October 2026.

The Mutanda copper and cobalt open-pit mine near Kolwezi, in a CBERS-4 satellite image captured 9 March 2018 and published by INPE. The image shows a mine, not a refinery or current operating conditions. Credit: Coordenação-Geral de Observação da Terra / INPE (Brazilian National Institute for Space Research). Image source · CC BY-SA 2.0 Generic